

Introduction:

Culture, Politics and Power in Indonesian Studies

The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable, humane existence for all its populace, and a state only can prosper if the culture there is virtuous and of a high standard.

Tujuan negara ialah untuk memberi penghidupan yang layak bagi manusia segenap penduduknya, dan negara hanya bisa hidup apabila kebudayaan disitu baik dan mempunyai tingkat yang tinggi.

Vice President Hatta in his opening address to the *Cultural Congress I*, 20 August 1948.¹

I hope that the congress this time results in agreements that society can use as a guide and can be implemented within culture in everyday life. So, no abstract concepts, but policies and strategies that are able to be internalised as values in an effort to clarify the self-respect of the nation, including values connected to character, morals and ethics.

Saya berharap kongres kali ini menghasilkan kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang bisa dipedomani oleh masyarakat untuk bisa diimplementasikan pada kebudayaan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Jadi, bukan konsepsi yang abstrak, tetapi sebagai kebijakan dan strategi yang dapat diinternalisasikan sebagai nilai-nilai dalam upaya mempertegas jati diri bangsa, termasuk yang berkaitan dengan akhlak, moral, dan etika.

State Minister for Culture and Tourism I Gede Ardika in his opening address to the *Cultural Congress V*, 20 October 2003.²

This thesis is the first extended historical study concerned with the cultural policy of successive Indonesian governments. I analyse what practices the state deemed ‘cultural’ and how they were used to shape a ‘national culture’. The bulk of the thesis explores the cultural policies of the national governments that have administered Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century. Analysis of these governments’ cultural policies requires some consideration of the policies of their forerunners. I argue that culture’s contemporary use within methods of governance was established during the late Dutch colonial and Japanese occupying administrations and has not been challenged within the

¹ (Hatta, 1950, p. 16). The proceedings of the Conference were published in 1950.

² (LAM, 2003).

different articulations of modern governance in Indonesia since 1950. Understanding the form that these articulations took between 1950 and 2003 is the main task of this thesis.

In one of the few articles to be focussed exclusively on cultural policy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia expert Jennifer Lindsay argues that the continued presence of traditional cultural practices is the primary determinant of the features of cultural policy in the region (1995). There are two key points in Lindsay's article. Firstly, she argues that in Southeast Asia, 'state cultural agencies act as patrons bestowing project funds and rewards rather than as service organisations' (1995, p. 661). Artists are 'clients' within this 'system of patronage' that began in pre-nationalist Southeast Asia and continues to be 'perpetuated in a modern setting' (1995, p. 663). Lindsay writes:

From the performers' point of view, then, the context of employment ... is not essentially different from a pre-national context. ... The government acts in the way a patron is traditionally expected to act – nominating the kind of performance, choosing the performers, vetting undesirable elements, favouring those whose performance pleases, and rejecting from favour those whose performance offends. (1995, pp. 664-5)

According to Lindsay, the continued centrality of the patron-client relationship to the role of government in cultural life differentiates cultural policy in Southeast Asia from cultural policy in the West, where the state commissions artists and audiences pay to view performances in a commercial context where demand influences content.

The second point is that Southeast Asian governments, as 'the most significant sources of ... patronage' (1995, p. 664), have introduced new concerns 'with ideas of national identity, acceptability and image' (1995, p. 663). They use their status as patrons to enforce a particular set of standards appropriate for the nation. Lindsay lists the governments' requirements as 'brevity and formality', 'accessibility' and 'dignified and entertaining' display (1995, p. 666). She writes: 'It is important that the performance is not offensive to other ethnic and religious sensibilities, or to a sense of official decorum and respectability' (1995, p. 666). The patron-client relationship places these government concerns in the forefront of the artists' considerations in contrast to the West, where, Lindsay contends, artists both comply less with government considerations and are more responsive to public opinion (1995, pp. 668-70).

Lindsay's article provides two important signposts for this thesis. Firstly, it can be used to assess the desirability of focusing on the patron-client relationship, which Lindsay uses to explain how Southeast Asian governments exercise control over artists. However, placing the patron-client relationship at the centre of cultural policy analysis also skews the argument in a way that both leaves important areas unaddressed and leads to misleading characterisations of cultural policy in Southeast Asia. First, Lindsay attributes the characteristics of Southeast Asian cultural policy to the desires of governments without interrogating what shapes those desires. Although government desire is a plausible cause, her reasoning does not provide great insight into why and how Southeast Asian governments chose particular cultural policy content. Second, emphasising the continuity of the patron-client relationship both across space and time neglects important breaks both between nations³ and, more importantly for this thesis, within nations. Lindsay does not explore the cultural policy differences among different political regimes in Indonesia nor the extent to which institutions and policies were inherited from or influenced by the Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupying administrations. A third issue is her reliance on a divide between cultural policy in Western nations and Southeast Asia. Governments in all locations attempt to bring about particular outcomes when they formulate and implement cultural policies (see, for instance, Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-164). The reasons Lindsay herself gives for subsidies in Australia, Europe and the United States (culture's 'educative, moral, heritage, aesthetic or ... spiritual value to society') are not all that different to her reasons for subsidy in Southeast Asia ('national identity, protection of moral and religious values, or protection of indigenous cultural heritage', 1995, p. 668).

The second signpost in Lindsay's article points towards an alternative focus for Indonesian cultural policy analysis. While noting that culture is commonly linked to education in many Southeast Asian nations, Lindsay writes that in Indonesia, 'the educative value of culture itself as a civilising agent of human behaviour' was never questioned in nationalist debates about culture. The links between culture and education (and the project of civilisation) suggest that alternative histories exist that predate the Indonesian nationalists. Culture has long been used in Europe as a method of civilising unruly elements of society (Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-106) and putting to use its civilising function was a central concern in the creation and regulation of public libraries, art

³ For instance, the cultural policy of a right-wing, USA-aligned dictatorship like the New Order regime is represented as having more continuities than breaks with Communist Vietnam.

galleries and museums in Britain in the eighteenth century (Bennett, 1998, pp. 107-134). Additionally, the Dutch colonial administration implemented its own programs that at times encapsulated a civilising mission aimed at the colony's indigenous inhabitants.⁴

The quotations at the beginning of this chapter, from prominent Indonesian politicians separated by over fifty years, indicate a similar concern with shaping the behaviours of Indonesians. Both of the quotations construct culture in a similar way: 'culture' refers to national culture, shared by all Indonesians, and encompasses behaviours and values ('virtuous and of a high standard' and 'values connected to character, morals and ethics'). The two politicians share the assumption that if a nation has the right culture, it will prosper and that the cultivation of culture was a concern of the state.

While this thesis shares Lindsay's focus on official cultural policies, I argue that investigating cultural policy's connections to modern forms of governance in Indonesia provides a more productive and insightful analysis than an emphasis on how the state functioned as a traditional patron. The recurring emphasis on the task of civilising subjects suggests the relationship between Indonesian, colonial and Western cultural policy is close, complex and cannot be ignored in analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia. Highlighting governance shifts attention towards the content of cultural policy programs and policies, highlighting changes in how culture was conceived and used in different locations and times.

Differentiating my perspective from Lindsay's also distances this thesis from an influential interpretation of Indonesian politics and society that emphasises ongoing patron-client relationships that are sustained by reference to an unchanging culture. I argue that Lindsay's approach conflates different historical eras that have different social, political and cultural relations. The alternative perspective pursued here, following the methods of Michel Foucault, attempts to identify and account for changes in cultural policy content and practice. It asks about Indonesian cultural policy: what has been retained, what has been lost and why has this happened? Taking this perspective requires an engagement with unresolved debates about culture and power in Indonesian Studies.

⁴ See Legge's summary (1977, pp. 94-105). I develop this connection further in Chapter One.

As such, this thesis focuses on the policies and institutions of the key official state apparatus concerned with regulating culture in Indonesia, in particular the institution responsible during the post-independence period, the Cultural Office, which in 1964 was renamed the Directorate of Culture. However, this is not the only way of defining cultural policy. If the definition of culture as ‘a way of life’ were used, as it now is in many academic fields, cultural policy would be any policy that affects everyday life (what I call the broad definition of cultural policy). Another issue, dealt with in detail in the methodology section that follows, is defining the limits of the thesis as official cultural policy. I begin with the premise that the state is the most important, but not the only cultural institution nor is it isolated from other Indonesian or international institutions. The state has been present in research about Indonesian culture, and it is rare now to find research that identifies its subject matter as ‘cultural’ that does not include a consideration of state policy and actions.⁵ Additionally, cultural policy in the narrow sense is often used, as researchers have identified (Bennett, 1989b, p. 6), to attempt to alter the ‘way of life’ of particular groups. All of these relationships and fields are considered where they impact on, or are implicated in, official Indonesian cultural policy.

1. Culture and the State in Indonesian Studies

There is no single concept of culture in Indonesian Studies. A multiplicity of concepts and categories has resulted from the diverse academic background of researchers on Indonesia and the tendency to include a cultural component in many different kinds of analysis. In this section, I briefly review the four most common research approaches to culture in Indonesian Studies with a focus on their characterisation of the state’s relationship to culture.

The first approach is located in political analysis. Analysts of Indonesian politics have attempted to use culture to explain political occurrences. There are two concerns regarding this formulation. Firstly, certain texts (in particular, texts which have used the notion of political culture) have separated political and economic causes from cultural

⁵ For instance, Anna Tsing’s research into a marginal ethnic group living in a remote mountain range in South Kalimantan demonstrates that cultural issues are not dictated by an internal community logic but are always under negotiation both within the community and externally with other communities and institutions (1993, pp. 8-9). According to Tsing, the most powerful institution that received the most attention from within the community was the state (1993, p. 13).

factors in seeking to explain Indonesian politics. Once separated as a variable, culture is often then defined as a set of values or attributes.⁶ Such an approach results in multiple problems: culture is represented as static and unchanging both across time and in different social contexts; rather than being mediated by culture, political and economic categories are considered generalisable across space and time rather than specific to a time and place; cultural traits are often generalised across communities, ignoring other divisions such as class, ethnicity and gender; activities defined as cultural are excluded from political analysis (Philpott, 2000, pp. 72-3);⁷ and the possibility of change is circumvented by static cultural attributes, which are viewed as the foundations of the political system.⁸

However, the more pressing concern is the way that culture has been used as an explanatory tool without interrogation of its construction in both Indonesia and Indonesian Studies. Simon Philpott, in *Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity*, is critical of the conceptualisation of culture in the study of Indonesian politics. He critiques both how cultural metaphors are used to frame political studies (2000, pp. ix-xii) and cultural explanations of behaviour (2000, pp. 76-87). In the same vein, Ken Young comments:

[Political science research about Southeast Asia] stresses culture as an explanatory variable above all others, yet it contributes so little to the study of culture itself, preferring to use it as a catch-all which tidies up all the otherwise inexplicable connections between the State and civil society. (1991, p. 99)

Culture often acquires explanatory force without attention to the relations of power that shape its usage, the multiple ways it is deployed and the ways it changes in different contexts. I return to this issue in the discussion in the following section regarding the construction of Javanese culture in the patrimonial approach to Indonesian politics.

While political research can threaten to impoverish culture, cultural research has political hazards. In his study of the construction of the Javanese subject and the functions of cultural tradition in New Order Indonesia, John Pemberton notes the convergence ‘between anthropological disciplinary interests in culture and repressive interests like

⁶ See, for instance, the work of Lucian Pye (1965, p. 8) and Sidney Verba (1965, p. 551).

⁷ See also the articles in Stivens (1991) for analysis regarding gender in Southeast Asian Studies including Indonesia.

⁸ For instance Karl Jackson, one of the key proponents of political culture in the study of Indonesian politics, wrote in 1978, ‘A political earthquake ... can briefly level the distribution of power in the country, but the tendencies toward bureaucratic polity soon re-emerge’ (1978c, p. 396).

those manifested under New Order conditions' (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton argues that any research that posits a general cultural order independent of political interests can reinforce the political order in the name of culture. He writes: 'What appears to remain is a purely *tradisional* culture free of political and historical implication, a culture dedicated to, as if by nature, its own celebration'⁹ (1994a, p. 15). Pemberton attempts to avoid affirming the political order of the New Order regime through writing histories of the development and changes of practices that have been labelled cultural. He demonstrates the importance of the New Order regime's use of its version of Javanese culture to confirm and strengthen the regime's political authority and critiques the regime's argument that its form of rule was culturally appropriate for Indonesia.

Most contemporary practitioners of anthropological research have recognised the relationship between political power and cultural praxis and address the state's relationship to their subject matter (Acciaioli, 2002; Tsing, 1993, pp. 22-26).¹⁰ By recognising that cultural and community practices are formed in negotiation with state discourses and that the community has the power to subvert and appropriate state policy and programs, many researchers avoid confirming the cultural/political divide critiqued by Pemberton. The state's attempts to influence cultural practices are now generally included in anthropological research. For instance, Carol Warren (1995) researches policies that exert impact on community practices, such as law reform, land tenure and local governance and how these policies are negotiated within community structures and understandings. Lyn Parker (2003, p. 265) takes a similar position that 'the New Order ... has reached into all aspects of village life – agriculture, education, health, transport, housing, food, clothing, cultural and religious life, health and reproduction, employment – and transformed them all.'

A third approach to culture in Indonesian Studies has focussed more explicitly still on the state's conceptualisation of culture and its impact in Indonesia. Research into cultural expression has been forced into a more direct engagement due to the state's numerous interventions and the political commentary of many cultural forms. Virginia Matheson Hooker and Howard Dick's broad introduction to the edited collection of articles *Culture*

⁹ Pemberton uses the Indonesian spelling for traditional.

¹⁰ Tom Boellstorff comments that anthropological study in Indonesia has been 'responsive to the methodological challenges of the contemporary period' (2002, p. 25).

and Society in New Order Indonesia, assesses the state's impact on culture from a number of different vantage points (1993). This is one of a number of works that reflect on the New Order regime's impact on cultural expression and cultural developments in Indonesia, through both its economic and cultural policies (Hatley, 1994; Zurbuchen, 1990). Hooker and Dick and Mary Zurbuchen move between a very broad definition of culture¹¹ to a focus on culture as the performing and creative arts, indicating the links between how Indonesians' live and behave and what they consider to be their culture. More focussed research on topics, such as Indonesian literature (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994; Foulcher, 1980; 1986; 1993b; Maier, 1987; 1993; Tickell, 1982), fine arts (Suaedy, 2002; Supangkat, 1990; 1994) and the popular performing arts (Effendi, 1998; Hefner, 1987; Suanda, 1995; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995), also explore the role of politics and the state in shaping cultural forms. The field of research about cultural expression helps reveal the complex and diverse ways that culture was used and impacted by official and non-official institutions and forms an important body of secondary sources for this thesis.

The final approach encompasses research into cultural institutions and industries. This research also indicates the importance of the state's conceptualisations of culture to how these industries were regulated and the resulting cultural products. For instance, Phillip Kitley argues that the regime's 'national cultural project' was central to the creation and regulation of Indonesian television (2000, pp. 3-4). Krishna Sen's account of New Order cinema also demonstrates the importance of the regime's regulation of Indonesians to its regulation of cinema, in particular the representation of the nation in film (1994, pp. 79-104). Similarly, the state's conceptualisation of national culture has played a vital role in arts educational institutions (Hellman, 1999; Hough, 2000), regulating cultural tourism (Picard, 1997; 1999; Vickers, 1989; Volkman, 1990) and in museums and theme parks (Acciaioli, 2001; Taylor, 1994; Wrath, 1997). In contrast to the focus on cultural texts and symbolism in research into cultural expression, research into cultural institutions and industries concerns itself with the pressures on institutions and their effects on cultural products and everyday experience. The concerns of this thesis with cultural regulation by

¹¹ Hooker and Dick (1993, p. 2) define culture broadly as embracing 'spiritual life, values, morality, education, and political processes' before focussing on a more narrow definition based around 'cultural expression'. Mary Zurbuchen makes a similar distinction (1990, p. 137), whereas Barbara Hatley limits her discussion to 'symbolic forms' (1994, p. 216) including discussions about the impact of broader changes on those forms.

state cultural institutions link it most closely to the cultural institutions and industries perspective.

2. Constructing the Relationship between the Indonesian State and Culture

Analysis of Indonesian cultural policy is fragmented because it has developed through the publication of a number of short articles emphasising a small number of themes, hindering the emergence of a more coherent understanding.¹² Below I outline the four most common perspectives on official Indonesian cultural policy.¹³

a. Impacts On Local Community Practices and Performing Arts

The area of research that has most often addressed official cultural policy is analysis of the state's influence on community practices and the popular performing arts. Much of the historical research about cultural policy has been written in response to the impact of official cultural policy on local community practices that have commonly been understood as rituals connected to ways of life.¹⁴ In this research, the state's interventions have been interpreted as bringing a different understanding of cultural practices into a community or, in the words of Greg Acciaioli in one of the first articles to address this issue, 'culture has become art' due to the policies of the state (1985, p. 162). After giving a general overview of the effects of state intervention and a few accounts of specific interventions, Acciaioli accuses the state of seeking to 'emasculate' regional community practices¹⁵ through bringing its 'true Culture based in the political philosophy of the *Pancasila*¹⁶ and the civic religion that undergirds it' to bear on the communities it

¹² An exception is the mammoth edited book *Kebijakan Kebudayaan di Masa Orde Baru (Cultural Policy in the New Order Era*, Tirtosudarmo, 2001) that covers six subject areas in 1404 pages.

Although a fantastic resource for information about cultural administrative structures and policy documents, *Kebijakan Kebudayaan* suffers from a lack of coherence and clear themes and a characterisation of all cultural policy as repressive that is mirrored by the larger field of Indonesian cultural policy analysis. Another expansive piece of research that avoids these problems is Michel Picard's excellent analysis of the impact of changing forms of governance on Balinese life, religion and culture across the twentieth century (1997). My study is more limited in that it only examines cultural policy and more encompassing in that it tackles the national policies in much more detail.

¹³ It should be noted that these characterisations are often combined (see, for instance, Foulcher, 1990, pp. 302-6). They are separated here due to the need to clearly engage with each of the four ideas.

¹⁴ Such assessments have generally been heavily influenced by anthropological understandings of culture. Greg Acciaioli (1985, p. 152) uses Pierre Bourdieu's idea of *doxa* (1977, p. 164) where the natural and the social world correspond.

¹⁵ Acciaioli uses the Indonesian word *adat* to refer to regional community practices that are based on local traditions.

¹⁶ The *Pancasila* is a group of five principles elaborated by Sukarno in 1945 as the basis of the Indonesian state – Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Welfare and Belief in God (Legge, 1977, p. 180).

governs (1985, p. 161). The result is an increasing divide between communities and their rituals as the state seeks to transform these into markers of state-administered national and regional identity.

Philip Yampolsky's assessment of the state's impact on regional performing arts provides a more detailed analysis of official cultural policy (1995). Yampolsky writes a general history of the official cultural policy before focussing on the New Order era. He also gives a description of the state's interventions, but frames the issue as interventions into the regional performing arts.¹⁷ Although he rejects the notion that there was a Machiavellian strategy behind the New Order regime's cultural policies,¹⁸ Yampolsky agrees with Acciaioli's assessment that state intervention breaks the links between regional communities and their community arts due to the 'redesigning' of art forms for 'external consumption' (1995, p. 714). However, he also provides examples of different forms of resistance to government policy.¹⁹ The existence of resistance leaves open the possibility of individuals, working either inside or outside of the bureaucracy, using government policies in ways that reinforce the links between communities and their arts (1995, p. 721).

While the negative effects of official cultural policy were immense, a few researchers have noted there were some positive effects. For instance, Kathy Foley writes about the introduction of state-sponsored arts festivals:

The change of context, however, is the most striking modification. Arts festivals expand the horizons of the arts. In traditional Southeast Asian society the arts were often used to enhance life-cycle ceremonies, aristocratic endeavours, or religious festivals. The tables are turned when the arts themselves become the festival ... [Removing arts] from a religious festival setting emphasizes their secular proclivity. Clearly the majority of the presentations are in the 'secular entertainment' category, and all are juxtaposed against performances from abroad. The time, place, and context of the Bali Arts Festival have allowed it, by virtue of

¹⁷ Yampolsky also pays more attention to the rationale behind the state's interventions into the arts with particular attention to the bureaucrats that implemented arts policy (1995, pp. 707-714). Widodo's article on *Tayuban* similarly interrogates the interventions of arts bureaucrats into regional performing arts, but in a specific case study and with more local detail (1995).

¹⁸ This is possibly a reference to Anderson's assessment of minority groups in Indonesia where he states that 'what was publicly presented as a prominority policy in fact represented a Machiavellian policy of divide and rule' (1987b, p. 77).

¹⁹ Yampolsky notes that some communities were resisting such changes, that there were possibilities for subversion even if the state 'co-opted' regional arts, that there has been a significant deal of criticism within Indonesia, and that the government's approach to the arts includes a great deal of confusion and imprecision (1995, pp. 718-21).

its emphasis on secular arts, to become a significant forum for modern experimentation and development. (1994, p. 276)²⁰

Foley's comments can be linked to a broader observation about the application of power, including centrally driven policy: it very rarely has completely negative effects. Parker has also noted the productive effects of the state's moves to spread and strengthen a sense of national community. In her book about Balinese village life, Parker argues 'against the assumed opposition of society and state and shows that we can only understand the longevity of the Suharto regime by understanding that villagers wanted to participate in the version of modernity offered by the Indonesian nation-state' (2003, p. 1).

This field of research, in particular the work of Acciaioli and Yampolsky, is one of the points of departure for this thesis. Yampolsky's brief history of official cultural policy, with its focus on the constitutional debates and the New Order regime's Five Year Development Plans (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita*), touches on important aspects of New Order era cultural policy. This thesis seeks to supplement his history through including the political and social circumstances that informed the bureaucratic developments at particular times. This thesis also offers an alternative perspective through adopting a different framework to the regional performing arts. Assessments of cultural policy focussed on the regional performing arts with only a few exceptions give an extremely negative appraisal of official Indonesian cultural policy. An analysis framed by the state's use of culture to shape a national community with a broader definition of what constitutes cultural policy would view the impact of state policy on regional performing arts as a negative aspect of a larger set of policies which had a much wider array of impacts across a number of different areas.

b. Indonesian culture as a version of Javanese culture

There are two related arguments regarding the representation of Indonesian culture as a version of Javanese culture. The first is a controversial but common notion regarding the structural causes of the political system and political behaviour in Indonesia. An example of this position is Karl Jackson, who, drawing from Benedict Anderson's analysis of the

²⁰ Lindsay's assessment of the performing arts in Southeast Asia also rejects the portrayal of cultural policy as completely 'top-down, with the imposition from above of undesirable requirements forcing undesirable changes' (1995: 657), but comes from a different perspective to Foley. The connection Lindsay makes with pre-existing cultural practices allows her to claim that there are continuities with pre-existing systems. However, this overlooks the many connections between cultural policy and governance which I discuss later in the introduction and draw throughout the thesis.

idea of power in Javanese culture (1990b), posits that the Indonesian political system is based on Javanese concepts of power and social organization (Jackson, 1978b, p. 34). According to this view (which provides a model for Lindsay's analysis of cultural policy), culturally determined patrimonial relationships between patrons and clients persist in Indonesia from pre-colonial Java and continue to shape the Indonesian political and social structure. Richard Robison has critiqued the patrimonial model from a Marxist perspective as ignoring the 'specific development of forms and relations of production' that provide a more concrete explanation regarding the shape of the Indonesian polity (1982a, p. 139). Philpott also rejects the patrimonial model and critiques its prominence as an explanation for Indonesian politics and society.²¹ Philpott notes that although such explanations demonstrate the 'pervasiveness of Javanese culture in New Order discourses' (2000, p. 94), they also rely on academy-approved cultural discourses rarely interrogated by analysts.

The second argument is located amongst cultural researchers rather than in political studies. While acknowledging that Javanese culture is a construction that has been shaped by a number of influences including political power, many researchers hold that the New Order's understanding of culture was still Java-centric.²² Pemberton's book, *The Subject of Java* (1994a), is the most prominent text about the construction of Javanese culture and its use by the New Order regime. The focus of *The Subject of Java* is an exploration and critique of 'the remarkable extent to which a rhetoric of culture enframes political will, delineates horizons of power' in New Order Indonesia (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton firstly argues that the particular relations of power, connected to indirect methods of rule, between the Dutch colonisers and the Javanese courts constructed both Java and the Javanese subject. One of the effects of Dutch interventions and political power was the construction of Javanese customs and traditions in the courtly texts as a way of excluding and domesticating the Dutch. The New Order regime drew on the constructed tradition of

²¹ Philpott argues that Javanese cultural performances have been used to frame Indonesian politics (2000, pp. xii-xiii) and notions of a 'Javanese sultan' and 'Javanese values' have been used to explain Suharto's style of rule (2000, pp. 78-82). See also Philpott (2000, pp. 184, fn 43&44). It is also relevant to note that other cultural clichés have been employed as explanatory devices in the analysis of Indonesian politics. For instance, the killings of 1965-6 were portrayed in books and newspapers as Malays running *amok* (See excerpts in Sulistyono, 2000, p. 133). Sulistyono argues against this generalised, cultural explanation for the killings.

²² For instance, Tsing, drawing on the work of Pemberton and patrimonial conceptions of political culture, argues that a constructed notion of Javanese culture dominated the cultural politics of the New Order regime (1993, pp. 22-5).

the Javanese courts in order to legitimise itself by presenting its authority as cultural and its use of ritual to represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered (1994a, pp. 148-196). Thus, Pemberton's account of the changing use of practices deemed culturally Javanese demonstrates how state power has transformed Javanese tradition, ritual and culture, firstly during the colonial period, and then during the New Order period.

In *The Subject of Java*, Pemberton skips the 1942-65 period because it constitutes a period of 'discontinuity' between eras where Java was constructed as based in tradition and ritual.²³ He states that those years 'trouble the virtual identity one might now read into 'Java'' (1994a, p. 26). The 1942-65 period was highly politicised and involved a number of struggles and debates between competing institutions over the constitution and use of Indonesian culture. Although certain perspectives on culture were systematically excluded after 1965, there were other constructions of Indonesia and Indonesian culture that also informed the New Order regime. For instance, the New Order regime borrowed and reconfigured ideas from both Sukarno (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 157-8) and artists influenced by Western liberalism (Supartono, Rasih, Agung, Roosa, & Razif, 2000, pp. 5-6). Most research that has touched in some way on cultural policy has been focussed on the New Order era, raising the issue of continuities and breaks with the cultural policies of previous eras.²⁴

Pemberton's careful historical research before 1945 and attention to the state's constructions of Javanese culture after 1965 demonstrates historically specific, changing and contested notions of culture and tradition that are intimately tied to political power and social change. The thrust of his argument about the New Order regime's construction of culture is well supported by Keith Foulcher in a much quoted article, where he writes that there is 'an increasing tendency to align 'Indonesia' with a redefined *priyayi* Java' (1990, p. 303). However this does not equate to either the essentialist assertion that Javanese concepts of power shape and hold together the political power structure or to the assertion that official cultural policy is based on a version of Javanese culture. Despite the

²³ This is not to say he argues that tradition and ritual were the same in both periods – he argues that there were significant differences. Vickers makes a similar criticism of the absence of the 1942-1965 period in *The Subject of Java* (1997, p. 178). Although Pemberton's emphasis on rural resistance to a degree ignores urban resistance, he is overt in his reasons for skipping the 1942-1965 period.

²⁴ Bali is an exception due to the number of assessments regarding its cultural history, which is quite different to the other provinces (Picard, 1997; Vickers, 1989). Another exception is the work into cultural industries and cultural expression mentioned previously.

New Order regime's use of the ceremonies and traditions from its version of Javanese culture, Indonesian culture is not simply a redefined version of Javanese culture. Foulcher, for instance, also acknowledges continuities with the nationalism of the Sukarno period within the construction of culture during the New Order era (1990, p. 303), while Ruth McVey highlights a continuity in the drive to modernise the most symbolically Javanese of art forms, *wayang*, among early nationalists, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI*) and the army-dominated New Order regime and a shared desire to improve the indigenous population (1986).

c. The Growth of Consumption and Indigenous Values

The third group of theories about the Indonesian state's relationship to culture situates Indonesia in the context of global and regional economic and social change and how these changes have impacted Indonesians' 'ways of life'. There are two elements of New Order era policy within this argument. First is the adoption of capitalist economic policy, which relates to the growth of consumer culture in Indonesia through an increasingly deregulated marketplace. Second is the Indonesian government's response to the growth of consumption of goods and lifestyles generally perceived to be Western within Indonesia. Since these are global and regional trends, I review both the broader trends and their specific operation within Indonesia to generate a complete picture of the forces at work.

The social phenomenon of modern consumption was first noted around the turn of the century in America (Veblen, 1953)²⁵ and Western Europe (Simmel, 1971)²⁶ as a result of changing economic and social patterns. The important difference between the twentieth century and the preceding years was not the existence of symbolic consumption, but its spread to a much larger proportion of the population, particularly after World War II (Bocock, 1992, p. 132). Symbolic consumption began to grow in Asia following the expansion of globalised capitalism in the 1970s and the search for new markets by international capital (Chua, 2000a, p. 3). Sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1989), have observed that consumption has become an important method of establishing and maintaining differences between groups, as well as an important tool of social

²⁵ First published 1899.

²⁶ First published 1903.

mobility. Although not as widespread in many parts of Asia compared to Western countries (Chua, 2000a, p. 8), amongst a growing proportion of Asians, it has become an important method of identity formation.

The spread of culture through consumption in the marketplace in liberal democracies such as America has regularly been depicted by agents of the state as operating independently of the state (Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 35-6). At a UNESCO roundtable in 1969, the United States, for instance, famously claimed to 'have no cultural policy' (Kammen, 1996, pp. 795,798), reflecting the idea that culture should be as free as possible from state intervention. However, as Miller and Yudice demonstrate in their discussion of the United States, the state has always exercised considerable influence on the production and distribution of cultural goods (2002, pp. 35-71). If, for instance, going to see a film is a cultural experience, then policies related to funding, free trade, classification, and the regulation of the film industry become part of the regulatory framework of culture.

Discussion of the growth of capitalism and related consumption habits in Indonesian Studies has centred on the issue of the Indonesian new rich.²⁷ The first publication to recognise the significance of the growth of the new rich in Indonesia was the February 1984 issue of the Indonesian journal *Prisma*. English language research soon followed (Dick, 1985; Lev, 1990; Robison, 1986) and, from 1996, *The New Rich in Asia* series of books has continued to pursue analysis of these groups (Chua, 2000b; Pinches, 1999; Robison & Goodman, 1996; Sen & Stivens, 1998). A major problem with research into the new rich has been the variety of groups which fall into the category (see, for instance, Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164, fn. 6; and, in the context of the Asia region, Robison & Goodman, 1996). If the category is divided by religion, ethnicity and political affiliations, it begins to lose its theoretical usefulness. However, a few traits run across all of the groups: their lives have been transformed by the economic growth of the New Order period (see Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 176-8; Robison, 1996, pp. 80-81) and they all partake in the consumption of middle class lifestyles (Dick, 1985, p. 74).

²⁷ New rich is another way of referring to what others, such as Dick (1985), have termed the middle class, while avoiding confusion over the more specific meaning given to the term by other researchers such as Robison (1996, pp. 84-95) to differentiate them from the bourgeoisie.

Ariel Heryanto's analysis of the 'new rich' in Indonesia demonstrates the centrality of consumption to the cultural construction and contestation of the identity of the groups identified as 'middle class' (1999b, p. 159). Heryanto identifies an increase in conspicuous consumption in the 1990s (1999b, pp. 163,167-8) and interactions between consumerism and constructions of both 'West' and 'East' (1999b, pp. 168-71), attitudes towards Chinese (1999b, pp. 171-3) and Islam (1999b, pp. 173-6). He argues that consumption and consumerism increasingly played an important role in contemporary Indonesian cultural politics. Other research into both consumption (Gerke, 2000, pp. 146-7) and the urban poor (Murray, 1991, p. 138) indicate that the consumerism of the new rich has begun to influence the habits of the urban poor and lower middle class. In the case of the growth of consumption, the state's economic policies were the cause of significant changes in Indonesian culture broadly defined. These changes were important to official cultural policy because they evoked a response from the New Order regime.

In the Southeast Asia region, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid movement of information associated with capitalist goods and services created some consternation amongst the regional governments. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Burma (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998, p. 203) opposed the cultural changes and the related political and social messages brought by international capitalism with a discourse of 'Asian values' which emphasised hard work, family values, respect for authority, social responsibility, discipline and support of leaders.²⁸ David Birch argues that the government discourses about Asian values were a way of asserting government control over a nation (1998a, p. 183). In the name of preserving Asian values, governments consolidated their political power through populist opposition to the bogeyman of negative Western values and maintained their political control through the rejection of press freedom and human rights by labelling them 'Western' and therefore incompatible with an Asian way of life (Birch, 1998a; 1998b).²⁹ However, the Asianisation of Asia should not be viewed as only repressing the lives of those packaged as Asian. For instance, Chua Beng Huat demonstrates the productive effects of 're-indigenisation' on fashion in Singapore (2003, pp. 76-92). Similarly, the Indonesian state was a patron of some indigenous Indonesian cultural forms and even repressive measures

²⁸ See, for instance, the list provided by Singapore's Senior Minister of State for Community Development, Ching Jit Koon (quoted in Birch, 1998a, p. 184).

²⁹ Chua Beng Huat identifies the primary motivation of anti-Westernism in Asia as 'political' and based around a rejection of a liberal democratic political model (2000a, p. 12).

had some productive effects. For instance, the existence of a repressive state encouraged the emergence of on-line papers and magazines that operated outside of the Indonesian state's constraining regulatory framework and the growth of an on-line readership (Birch, 1998b, p. 338; Sen & Hill, 2000, pp. 200-2).

The New Order regime similarly employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to influence the habits of its populace (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998; Vickers & Fisher, 1999). Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, write:

All the elements of 'Asian values' can be found in the way the New Order attempted to clarify and institutionalise 'Indonesian values'. The ideals of family and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western 'Other'. (1999, p. 398)

An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse³⁰ has been the political justification of a more authoritarian political system against criticisms from advocates of liberal-democratic models and associated individual rights (Bourchier, 1998, p. 207; Vickers & Fisher, 1999, p. 398).³¹ However, there was also a more widespread and pervasive use. Indonesian values also functioned as a form of control over cultural practices associated with the nation. The regime used the official state ideology of the *Pancasila* and associated programs to instil a model of conduct into the population through education in schools and the workplace (Bourchier, 1998, pp. 207-8). In this regard, David Birch's comment about Asian values could also apply to Indonesia:

What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural capital of what constitutes the public cultures of 'Asianness'. (1998a, p. 198)

Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a 'proactive aspect' in its creation of Indonesian citizens (1998, p. 207). While the regime's cultural policy response to greater integration with the outside world and growing consumption is examined in chapters three and four, other research has also noted the proactive elements and results of the regime's use of Indonesian values discourse. Researchers have assessed how it has been used in the construction of Indonesian citizens through education (Leigh, 1991; Parker, 1992), through alternative readings of government discourses such as the

³⁰ Vickers and Fisher use the term 'Indonesian values' (1999, p. 382) whereas Bourchier uses 'indigenous values' (1998, p. 204).

³¹ It should be noted that the 'Indonesian values' discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about Indonesian identity. Thus was not a new phenomenon as much as a strengthening of a conservative understanding of Indonesian culture (Bourchier, 1998).

Pancasila to argue in favour of democratic reforms (Ramage, 1995, pp. 45-74,156-83) and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the regime's assertion that individual rights are not important to being Indonesian (Bourchier, 1998, pp. 209-11; Vickers & Fisher, 1999, pp. 396-8). Carol Warren's account of the different readings of terms and concepts common in New Order Indonesia and the contests over meanings that they involve also indicates how New Order concepts and language shaped political action (1990).

d. New Order National Culture as Military Culture

A fourth concept of the New Order regime's cultural policy which has not yet received much critical attention from English-language researchers has begun to be articulated by emerging Indonesian left-wing critics. One of the forums for left-wing criticism of the cultural policy of Indonesian governments from the late 1990s has been the magazine *Media Kerja Budaya*, published by cultural workers in Jakarta.³² The position of *Media Kerja Budaya* on national culture is that it should be diverse, inclusive (particularly of Indonesian urban and rural working class cultural practices), and promote involvement of diverse groups and people in cultural work (Supartono et al., 2000, pp. 5-6,15). According to this analysis, the New Order regime nurtured 'a military culture' that was homogenising and limited. A group of writers calling themselves the '*Media Kerja Budaya* Team' are critical of the impact of the New Order regime on culture:

What triumphantly surfaced was a military culture! Ceremonies and drills, *P4*³³ indoctrination, the standardisation of curriculum, the sole foundation [*Pancasila*] in politics, the banning of art activities are only several examples from the strength of the spirit of militarism in our culture for the last three decades. (Supartono et al., 2000, p. 15)

Yang muncul berjaya adalah kebudayaan militer! Upacara dan baris-berbaris, indoktrinasi P4, penyeragaman kurikulum, asas tunggal dalam politik, pelarangan kegiatan kesenian hanyalah beberapa contoh dari kuatnya semangat militerisme dalam kebudayaan kita selama tiga dekade terakhir.

The background of the New Order leadership, particularly in its early years, to some degree supports the above statement. When the New Order regime came to power, its leaders had generally received a military education and many had been influenced by

³² Although most of my information here comes from this magazine, it has been supplemented with interviews and discussions in Indonesia.

³³ *P4* is the acronym for *Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Orientation in Life and the Implementation of the Principles of the Pancasila)*, the New Order regime's civic education program that was implemented in schools, universities and workplaces in Indonesia.

their training under the Japanese, experiences during the revolution and their political conflict with the PKI, including its bloody resolution (Crouch, 1978, pp. 24-42).³⁴

The emphasis on the authoritarianism of the New Order serves here as a reminder of the political outlook of groups within the New Order elite and the kinds of pressures they put on cultural policy. However, the discussion of culture and the state in the preceding sections demonstrates that a single perspective never determined how policy related to culture and neither was the resulting cultural policy purely oppressive in either intention or results. Instead, the work of the emerging Indonesian left should be viewed as a reminder of the negative elements of the New Order government³⁵ and should also be read alongside accounts of the more productive elements of state policy.

A second issue is the characterisation of the New Order state as having a single rationale. There is a tendency in much research about the New Order regime and culture to present the state as a homogenous entity. For instance, Pemberton's research does not acknowledge differences within the state itself, particularly between the national government and the provincial and local governments, leading Vickers to write that Pemberton's homogenisation of the New Order state is 'an essentialised explanatory key to different kinds of changes in ceremonial action and representation' within his research (1997, p. 178). Similarly, Acciaioli's focus on state interventions from the perspective of marginal communities presents the state as a singular external force that seeks to impose its understanding of cultural practices on the community (1985). This representation has been compounded by a tendency within Indonesian Studies to represent the state as a single entity and operating independently of the international context and non-state institutions (see van Klinken, 2001b). In this thesis, the Indonesian state is considered far from unified and including diverse opinions and perspectives that differ significantly between different levels of the state³⁶ and, as I argue in the chapters that follow, multiple discourses about national culture.

³⁴ Adam makes a similar criticism of officially-sanctioned New Order era historiography when he summarised its impact as 'the militarization of history and nationalism' (2005, p. 272).

³⁵ Particularly impressive is the *Jaringan Kerja Budaya's* research into book bans during the New Order era (1999).

³⁶ See Schiller's research into state formation in Jepara, Java, where he notes the changing relationship between different levels of the state and the uniqueness of the state in Jepara itself (1996, pp. 28-98).

A final question that applies to the vast majority of cultural policy research, conducted as it was before the fall of Suharto, is the extent to which it remains applicable in post-New Order Indonesia. The economic crisis that began in late 1997 and the subsequent resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998 preceded a period of rapid political and social change. Now the post-Suharto state's cultural policies need to be analysed with reference to both broad global and regional trends and internal changes within Indonesia. The need for new assessments is made more pressing by the length of the New Order regime and the existence of certain continuities within its cultural policies since the early 1970s. Even if there is a high degree of continuity across the periods, the impact of the political and social changes on pre-existing cultural policies needs to be assessed.

3. Thesis Objectives

Arising from the previous discussion, my first objective is:

To analyse the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in a way that identifies continuities and breaks within and between different governments and interrogates their interaction. In particular, the thesis will address changes that have occurred between the Suharto and post-Suharto governments.

My second objective is:

To examine the application of the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in state sponsored cultural institutions and how those institutions understood and targeted the attributes and behaviours of Indonesians during the New Order and the Reform eras.³⁷

The singular pursuit of the first objective would come close to representing the Indonesian state as monolithic. As Gerry van Klinken has argued, there is a pressing need to include analysis of the lower levels of government as they have their own political conflicts, dynamics and histories which have become increasingly important in post-New Order Indonesia (2001c, pp. 2-4,23-4). It is not enough to analyse the broad changes in policy and discourse. Through the second objective, I give attention to the actual application of cultural policy through programs and activities. I argue that the homogenous representations of Indonesia produced by the bureaucrats in Jakarta were far from the diverse and negotiated situation that existed at the lower levels of government.

³⁷ The first four years of the Reform era, finishing at the end of 2003 are investigated here.

4. Methodology

Designing an appropriate methodology for analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia hinges on two areas of debate within two different academic communities: debates over Indonesian political analysis conducted within Indonesian Studies and debates over cultural policy analysis within Cultural Studies. Recent debates about Indonesian political analysis have highlighted the need for a rethink of the conceptualisation of the state in Indonesia and its relationship to society and social groups beyond the political elite. Developing a method of analysis that clarifies the operations of the Indonesian state connects with debates over the state's relationship with cultural practices, which have been conducted in Cultural Studies, as both revolve around analysis of the state/society relationship. Despite differences in subject matters, similar methodological moves are required now in political studies about Indonesia as were made in Cultural Studies perspectives on cultural policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Below I critically review different perspectives about the state in Indonesian political studies before exploring the options for a perspective that better recognises the links between the Indonesian state and society. Then I turn to different methods of cultural policy analysis and debates within Cultural Studies over the most appropriate method for tackling policy issues before reflecting on these issues in the context of research into Indonesian culture. My analysis suggests that the writings of Foucault and his concept of governmentality, which have already been canvassed in both fields, is possibly the best available method for linking culture and government policy in Indonesia.

State, Society and Culture in the Study of Indonesian Politics

a. Understanding the Indonesian State

The study of Indonesian politics has been shaped by the conditions of its emergence following World War II and the subsequent events. Particularly relevant is the institutionalisation of certain liberal assumptions as a result of the spread of American influence and decline of European influence throughout Southeast Asia (Anderson, 1982, p. 70; Philpott, 2000, pp. 46-55). In an article reflecting on the dominant methodologies of the early years of Indonesian Studies, Anderson identifies the two dominant perspectives in Indonesian Studies of the 1950 to 1965 period, despite significant differences in method and attitudes to nationalism, share a focus on the political elite and

political institutions and generally share a commitment to the spread of liberal democracy.³⁸

Analysis of the New Order years generated greater debate about methodological approaches to Indonesian politics and in particular the New Order state. Andrew MacIntyre identifies six perspectives about the Indonesian state (1990, pp. 6-21): state-qua-state,³⁹ bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster,⁴⁰ bureaucratic pluralism,⁴¹ bureaucratic authoritarianism,⁴² structuralist approach,⁴³ and restricted pluralism.⁴⁴ Mark Berger's account of trends in the study of Indonesian politics consolidates MacIntyre's six perspectives into three approaches: liberal state-society approaches that developed out of revisions of modernisation theory (which groups together bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster, bureaucratic pluralism, bureaucratic authoritarianism and restricted pluralism); Marxist analysis (labelled structuralist by MacIntyre); and state-qua-state. Of the 'liberal state-society' approaches, the most used has been patrimonialism (drawn in particular from the work of Harold Crouch⁴⁵), which emphasises patron-client relationships between rulers and political and business elite, with different patron-client cartels competing for rewards dispersed by the ruler.⁴⁶ In this model, politics is characterised by conflicts over resources rather than being driven by ideological differences or policy issues.

The Marxist approach to Indonesian politics grew out of a critical review of dependency theory which was in vogue in the 1970s and a critique of the 'liberal state-society

³⁸ See Anderson (1982, pp. 71-83). Anderson labels the approaches (1) anticolonial liberalism and the historical method, which centred around George Kahin and dominated the beginning and middle of the 1950s, and (2) imperial liberalism and the comparative method which came to the fore at the end of the 1950s and was reliant on the doctrine of modernisation and related universalist assumptions about political systems and societies (1982, p. 75). As such, modernisation theory assisted the spread of American capital and institutions across Asia. Some scholars, including Pauker and Pye, accepted the demise of the liberal constitutional order as the agent of modernisation and argued that military regimes would be adequate substitutes. See their chapters in Johnson (1962).

³⁹ MacIntyre cites Anderson (1990c). I discuss the state-qua-state approach later in this section.

⁴⁰ He cites Jackson (1978a) on the bureaucratic polity and Crouch (1979; 1980; 1984) on patrimonialism.

⁴¹ This is a reference to Emmerson's argument that there is more plurality within the bureaucracy than recognised by Anderson and that policy debate is more widespread than recognised by researchers in the bureaucratic polity and patrimonialism perspective (1983).

⁴² MacIntyre cites King (1982) and refers to his use of corporatism to understand how the New Order regime prevented dissent by structuring interest representation through regime-controlled groups.

⁴³ MacIntyre cites Robison (1978; 1982b; 1985; 1986; 1988), whose approach I discuss below.

⁴⁴ MacIntyre cites Liddle (1985; 1987).

⁴⁵ See the citations in footnote 40.

⁴⁶ Both MacIntyre (1990, p. 8) and Berger (1997, p. 325) identify patrimonialism as the most used or 'conventional' approach to Indonesian politics.

approach'. The most well-known proponent of a Marxist approach is Richard Robison, whose analysis hinges on identifying class tensions within Indonesian society created by the changing capitalist system and analysis of how these were managed through the corporatist strategies of the New Order regime (1986). The state-qua-state perspective has its basis in a single article by Anderson (1990c). Anderson argues that the state and the nation are separate entities and characterises different periods in Indonesian history by the strength of one relative to the other. MacIntyre writes that 'Anderson's argument is perhaps most usefully interpreted as a response to instrumentalist Marxist views of the state as a tool of the capitalist class' (1990, p. 7). Anderson emphasises the complicated dynamics of historical change in accounting for the rise of the New Order state.

My purpose in reviewing the different perspectives is to identify the possibilities they raise for analysis of cultural policy. Two issues are of concern. The first has been touched on earlier, in particular in regards to the idea of patrimonialism: the use of culture as an explanatory tool in Indonesian Studies without any interrogation of the relations of power which shape its features and limit how it is able to be used. Researchers following the 'liberal state-society' methodology in particular have resorted to culture as an explanatory device.⁴⁷ Philpott also notes that Robison, after claiming that Anderson's state-qua-state perspective relied on culturalist assumptions,⁴⁸ 'falls back on categories such as ethnicity, culture, and 'history', none of which enter into his critical calculations' (2000, pp. 74-6,84-7). Of the perspectives, Anderson's state-qua-state offers the most promise as its emphasis on historical specificity in the constitution of the Indonesian state and nation does not allow culture to become an ahistorical, universal category.

The second issue relates not to culture but to policy. Research into Indonesian politics has separated the state and civil society and focussed its attentions almost exclusively on the state. MacIntyre, for instance, asserts that while there is disagreement about explanations for the system of governance in Indonesia, 'it remains inescapable that there is an underlying consensus centring on the idea that the state is largely unfettered by societal interests in the determination of policy' (1990, p. 17). Young argues that the narrow focus on the state is a problem not just for studies of Indonesian politics (echoed in van

⁴⁷ On the use of culture in the work of Crouch and an influential article by Macintyre and Jamie Mackie see Philpott (2000, pp. 78-84).

⁴⁸ Robison writes that 'the New Order state cannot be understood as some ahistorical, universal Javanese state transcending its specific history and social environment' (1986, p. 84).

Klinken's work a decade later, 2001b) but Southeast Asian political studies and that certain issues are excluded from political analysis as a result. He writes:

Research into political trends in Southeast Asia takes place in a theoretical and institutional context which cleaves firmly to the discipline's origins which were concerned with institutional analyses focused above all else on the government, the state and the ruling elite. (1991, p. 100)

The problem the state-society division causes for the study of policy in Indonesia is that it ignores how the New Order's sustained authoritarian rule relied on particular constructions of the Indonesian subject in policy as well as the use of coercive force and how these constructions had effects on behaviours and subjectivities. Philpott writes:

A striking feature of the discourse of Indonesian politics is that it ignores the full range of practices lumped together under the rubric of the state's other, civil society. ... Practitioners of the discourse of Indonesian politics have commonly asserted, explicitly or otherwise, that the Indonesian state had distinct interests and, in that sense, is autonomous of civil society. However, the specific ways in which the New Order's will to govern was realized in civil society have been neglected. (2000, pp. 144-5)

The study of the relationship between the state and culture needs a methodology that brings into focus the more complex and indirect forms of power that exist in addition to the direct application of state power for the protection and furtherment of state and ruling elites' interests.

b. Power, the State and Foucault

Although not overly concerned with legitimacy and consent, the limits of Indonesian politics drawn by post-World War II social science cause it to adhere to the focus of the kind of 'political theory' criticised by Foucault because of its narrow scope. Foucault stated in an interview in 1977:

What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done. (1980, p. 121)

Foucault's move to broaden political theory hinges on a revision of the concept of power. Analysis of Indonesian politics has generally viewed power negatively. Philpott writes: 'Power is almost exclusively understood as militarised, violent, repressive, and censorious' (2000, p. 147). Foucault, on the other hand, labels this kind of power relations 'domination' and considers it to be one of many structures of power. Foucault's definition of power does not privilege a single set or type of power relations. Power, at its

most basic level, 'designates relationships between partners' which refers to 'an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another' (1982, p. 217). As such, power is inherently unstable, ambiguous, reversible and is dispersed throughout the network of human relations rather than just the possession of the powerful.

Between domination (where there is little room for resistance) and the flowing, easily reversible type of power described above,⁴⁹ Foucault identifies the category of power relations which is the chief concern of this thesis: *government*. Foucault outlined his ideas about government in a lecture titled 'Governmentality' given in 1978 (1991b). Government is defined as 'the conduct of conduct' or the regulation of the ways people regulate their own behaviour. In the lecture, Foucault traces the emergence of increasingly complicated forms of government since the sixteenth century around the changing answers to questions concerned with the best possible forms of governance not just of states and nations but also of the individual and of families. However, the dissemination of new forms of government throughout a population is linked to a particular form of government: the type of government concerned with managing the nation-state as a whole, the 'art of the state' (1991b, p. 90). The state became increasingly concerned with the correct management of individuals, people and goods, rendering the state's use of domination far less important than the use of government. It is in this sense that Foucault referred to the 'governmentalisation of the state' (1991b, pp. 102-3). Within this formulation, the task of regulating conduct is not just that of the state. Instead, the agencies of the state are one set of instruments of government amongst others, leading Foucault to write that 'maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity [is the] governmentalisation of the state' (1991b, p. 103).

Central to Foucault's research into governance is a recognition of the importance of the particular rationalities of government (which he termed governmentality) – the discourses that construct the logic of governmental powers – at work in any given situation. Discourses, in Foucault's work, are the building blocks of knowledge and power. Discourses are not just ways of speaking, but also ways of thinking and acting that

⁴⁹ Foucault describes this form of power as 'strategic games between liberties' (1988, p. 19).

are held together by a particular set of relations (1972, pp. 44-5). Hence Foucault talks of discourses not ‘as groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (1972, p. 49).⁵⁰ Discourses then do not describe pre-existing objects, but imbue objects with meaning and purpose. Through the concept of discourse, Foucault attempts to disrupt the groupings that ‘purport to be natural, immediate, universal unities’ (1972, p. 29) by describing the specific operations of a statement or practice in a particular historical moment in order to engage with the set of relations that regulates its operation.

Foucault writes that ‘a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’ (1990, p. 101). Meaning, in other words, is socially constructed across a number of sites through discourses. Rationalities of government are discursive formations – combinations of discourses held together by sets of relations that produce a certain network of material relations. However, as Foucault notes, discourses within discursive formations can contradict and oppose as well as reinforce, and can form the basis for opposition. The use of ‘strategy’ in the previous quote from Foucault deserves some attention. Discourses and rationalities of government do not presuppose a consciousness of a contest over meaning. A strategy, however, includes an element of choice in the designation of means, actions or procedures in order to come up with winning solutions (1982, pp. 224-5). Discourses can be strategically deployed in power-games in a calculated effort to overcome resistance.

Despite the array of governmental rationalities that operate in modern society independently of the state, Foucault still views the state as important and as having become more important recently. Foucault writes: ‘power relations have been progressively governmentalised, that is to say, elaborated, rationalised, and centralised in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions’ (1982, p. 224). The different areas which have come under state surveillance have become increasingly diversified and, even though the state is not seeking to dominate many fields of possible intervention, it has greatly increased its regulatory role and become increasingly reliant on non-state

⁵⁰ Foucault, as Vehne notes, studied ‘practice by way of discourse’ (1997, p. fn.1). While I choose to retain discourse as a tool of analysis, other policy analysts that have drawn from Foucault, like Dean (1999), have done away with discourse in favour of ‘practice’.

rationalities of government. The state is therefore still worthy of attention as an important and large set of institutions in the web of governmental power relations that underwrite social institutions and subjectivities. However, for Foucault societal institutions are also superstructural to the state and form an element of the tactics through which the continued existence of the state is made possible. Thus, Foucault writes that ‘the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality’ (1991b, p. 103).

The state as a whole would be an unwieldy unit of analysis within a Foucaultian framework. It is too large, too fragmented and caught in so many relations of power that detailed analysis would be rendered near impossible. Instead, Foucault suggests that analysing power relations is best done by ‘focussing on carefully defined institutions’ (1982, p. 222). Institutions are the sites at which governmental rationalities meet, intertwine, disagree, are translated into technologies and applied to subjects. Translated back into policy terms, focusing on a particular institution provides an insight into how the development and application of policy is contingent on the operations of a particular combination of power relations in that institution and links those relations together with broader historical movements.

Foucault’s research methods and ideas about power, government and the state have been developed by a number of scholars and have become known as the governmentality perspective. This perspective became more widely known through an edited book that included Foucault’s ‘Governmentality’ lecture along with a number of other pieces analysing and applying his ideas (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). It has since spread amongst researchers due to the insights it gives into the ways we are governed and related operations of power. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osbourne and Nikolas Rose’s comment on the governmental studies in *Foucault and Political Reason* can be generalised more broadly to understand the appeal of governmental analysis:

These perspectives on governmentalities deliver, we think, real and immediate gains, conferring a new kind of intelligibility upon the strategies that seek to govern us, and the ways in which we have come to understand, embrace or contest such strategies. (1996, p. 16)

Governmental analysis has been particularly used in research about liberal democracies (Barry et al., 1996; Burchell, 1993; Hindess, 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992), but has also

been applied in many other areas including psychology (Rose, 1996b) and cultural policy (Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 2002).

c. Governmentality and the New Order Regime

Foucault's theories on power and the state provide possible solutions for some of the limitations within studies about Indonesian politics referred to earlier. Foucault provides a broadened definition of power that recognises its productive and restrictive effects. Indonesian political studies concerns with elite politics and the state can be supplemented with research into the techniques through which governmental rationalities are inscribed into the everyday practices of a populace, the resistances they meet and their responses and changes. Political power, in such a formulation, exists beyond the state.

Another important contribution would be Foucault's challenge to the structural soundness of the state-civil society divide in studies of Indonesian politics. The state/civil society divide is itself a construction of particular governmental rationalities, as are the limits of state action which were adopted by the New Order regime. To borrow from Foucault again:

It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on. (1991b, p. 108)

Within Foucault's research, the state-civil society divide itself is contingent on the particular rationality of government being employed and can hide the full extent of the operations of power in civil society. In this framework, institutions and policy become recognised as central to the functioning of the state and their results become contingent in that their strategic deployment of discourses can be resisted or coopted.

Foucault's own work was focussed on Western Europe and most of the Governmentality literature is focussed on Western liberal democracies. However, Foucault's concepts have been used in Asian and Latin American contexts.⁵¹ In *Rethinking Indonesia*, Philpott begins the methodological work of considering how Governmentality would operate in the Indonesian context. Philpott argues that Indonesians were not just subject to domination while being under the New Order regime, although this form of power was

⁵¹ See Stoler (1995b), Said (1993) and Escobar (1984-5).

more widely used than in Western liberal democracies, but were also subject to governmental relations of power. He writes:

[The] New Order regime also attempted to regulate, both directly and indirectly, the behaviour of citizens. This regulation sought the realisation of certain aims, desires and goals, suggesting that the New Order's practices manifested more than a simple desire for domination ... The bodies of Indonesians are targets of particular technologies and strategies that seek to construct productive, regulated, controlled, adapted and ultimately, 'governed' subjects. (2000, p. 150)

Philpott suggests that an 'authoritarian governmentality' (2000, pp. 167-177) existed in Indonesia with its own specific rationality and effects. The New Order 'authoritarian governmentality' was defined partly in opposition to liberalism and explicitly rejected the separation of state and society (2000, pp. 150-1) and is indebted to a 'development' discourse (2000, p. 173).⁵²

Recent writings on governmentality have explored the connection between liberal and authoritarian governmentalities through examining their shared understandings regarding what constitutes government. Mitchell Dean (1999, pp. 98-102) argues that central to liberalism is the understanding that government is the task of regulating naturally occurring processes in society through the measurement of populations. Although liberalism is generally associated with freedom, the operation of government in liberal societies has incorporated elements of what Barry Hindess has termed 'unfreedom' or 'authoritarian rule' (2001, p. 94). Liberal rationalities of government are based on the assumption that freedom is the ideal condition for individuals to make rational decisions (Hindess, 2001, pp. 98-100). However, this raises the problem of ensuring that individuals have the appropriate capacity for 'autonomous' action, or in other words, make their choices rationally where their 'rationality' concurs with the logic of the state. The result has been that large populations (by far the majority of subjects of liberal rule before 1945) have been excluded from full liberal citizenship. Hindess identifies three categories of response within liberal thought to these populations: extermination, such as John Locke's suggestions about the native inhabitants of America, (Hindess, 2001, p. 101); compulsion of these populations to acquire the required capacities through the imposition of discipline; and, in the case of 'relatively civilised populations', government

⁵² Philpott also makes an observation which further recommends a governmental approach as the most appropriate choice for the topic of this thesis: 'Importantly, governmentality disturbs the explanatory force of culture in the discourse of Indonesian politics by treating it as a site at which Indonesians are governed' (2000, p. 176). Culture, within a governmental formulation, is constituted within a discursive formation aimed at shaping the attributes of populations. I return to this topic in the next section.

facilitation of their development through providing a ‘benign and supportive environment’, such as welfare distribution (Hindess, 2001, p. 99). Colonised peoples, such as the indigenous populations of India and also Indonesia, fit into the second category. According to John Stuart Mill, these populations benefit from continued enslavement since they are not sufficiently advanced ‘to be fitted for representative government’ (Mill, 1977, p. 567 in Hindess, 2001, p. 105).⁵³

While the measurement of processes and populations, best exemplified in the sciences of economics and demography, was essential to the birth of liberalism, they have also become essential to other forms of government. From early in the nineteenth century, identifying and managing populations and processes has become the principal concern of most contemporary methods of governance. Dean argues:

the governmentalisation of the state occurs according to a line of modification along which [previous conceptions of government are] supplemented, and to some degree displaced and reinscribed, by a government through particular and specifiable processes, at once opaque to rulers but rendered knowable by definite forms of knowledge. In this regard, liberal, social democratic, and even authoritarian and statist forms of rule can be understood as variations on the consequences of such a line of modification. (1999, p. 102)

While liberal rationalities of government limited the extent that state control could be exercised over at least a portion of a nation’s citizens due to a concern with the freedom of citizens (Dean, 1999, pp. 98-112), non-liberal rationalities of government have shown less restraint. In Indonesia, the Family Planning program (*Keluarga Berencana*) undertaken by the New Order regime conflated ‘the interests of the family and the health of the nation-state’s economy’ (Newland, 2001, p. 22). Lynda Newlands’ assessment of Family Planning, which included ‘military’ style strategies (2001, pp. 35,27), indicates a more paternalistic style with an emphasis on reaching quotas rather than women’s health (2001, p. 42) and greater intrusion and intervention than generally the case in Western health programs (2001, p. 44).

Rather than developing an account of the rationalities of government present in New Order Indonesia, Philpott’s analysis is more focussed on demonstrating how a governmental perspective might address some of the shortcomings of the mainstream forms of analysis in Indonesian political studies. Other research into specific institutions

⁵³ I explore this issue further in my discussion of colonial government in the next chapter.

and industries in Indonesia has demonstrated that the subject of New Order Indonesia is constituted by relations of power that emanate from the official apparatus such as educational institutions (Leigh, 1991; Parker, 1992) and family planning (Newland, 2001; Sullivan, 1991), as well as non-state institutions including the media (Kitley, 2001; Sen & Hill, 2000) and labour migration companies (Rudnyckyj, 2004) and Islam (Hefner, 1998a). In this research, the subject is not just constituted through these discourses but through resistance to and the interaction of these discourses, demonstrating that there is much existing Indonesian Studies research that can be drawn on in a governmental analysis.

A governmental perspective addresses some of the methodological concerns raised previously. It recognises that power is productive and moves beyond the conception that power is limited to political power. A governmental perspective also provides the analytical tools to differentiate between different discourses within the state and recognises that the state is heterogeneous. Most importantly, it recognises that government exists beyond the state and begins to move beyond the state-society divide in seeking to understand how people are governed. It focuses attention towards the discourses, strategies, rationalities and institutions that are implicated in forming Indonesians and the continued existence of the nation-state. Culture, within this framework, is of strategic importance as an element of social life that is closely related to group and individual identity. It offers a means for the state and other institutions to target populations and as such is a form of governmentality that can be analysed through the discursive structure that gives it meaning.

Researching Cultural Policy

The discussion of Foucault's conceptions of power provides a broad methodology for analysing cultural policy. However, a more detailed methodology is needed if the features and characteristics of Indonesian cultural policies are to be explained. My search for an appropriate methodology in cultural policy research led, once again, to Foucault. Before revisiting the debates in Cultural Studies around cultural policy research, there is a need to sketch the cultural policy field to locate the perspective I take amongst a diverse and growing body of work and assess its suitability when compared to other perspectives. My purpose in returning to the cultural policy debates is both to explore how the cultural

linkages between society and state were theorised in this debate and introduce the key positions of this methodology. These debates inform the next section where I analyse the resulting cultural policy practice to fashion an appropriate methodology for Indonesia.

a. Different Analytical Perspectives on Cultural Policy

The use of culture by the state has long been a concern of intellectuals and visionaries. Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1882)⁵⁴ deals extensively with the state's use of culture to create a model society. Arnold takes an aesthetic view of culture that limits it to a narrow selection of practices which he considers to be close to human perfection (1882, p. 39). Writings about culture and the state by Marxist theorists also privileged the role of a few experts in identifying cultural quality and perfection (for instance, Adorno, 1991) forming a general point of agreement across the political spectrum. In the 50s, 60s and 70s, more pluralistic conceptions of culture began to challenge the cultural elitism of older theories particularly in the research relating to popular and working class culture (for instance, Hoggart, 1972; Thompson, 1963; Williams, 1965) and writings about race and colonialism (Fanon, 1963; 1967).

Also in the 1970s, social scientists began to bring new forms of analysis to culture and the arts in particular. Some of the current trends in cultural policy research hark back to this time: 'Cultural Policy Studies' was named and undertaken through the creation of the Association of Cultural Economics and the Center for Urban Studies at the University of Akron; Herbert Gans published his work on 'taste cultures' (1974); and social science journals such as the *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* (est. 1969), and the *Journal of Cultural Economics* (est. 1973) began ongoing publication.⁵⁵ Although beginning at the same time as the changes in other disciplines, this body of research was oriented towards the needs of states, which were involved in their own processes of cultural policy reform. Previously, many Western countries had limited cultural policy to arts funding, which was generally directed to activities considered to be elements of high culture. From the 1970s until the present, the scope of cultural policy in Western countries has expanded to include a widening variety of practices and objects along with a broader set of objectives. Cultural policy research in the West has a reciprocal

⁵⁴ First published in 1882.

⁵⁵ See Miller and Yudice (2002, p. 29) for a more detailed account and critique of this movement.

relationship with the changing scope and priorities of states whose policies and institutions generally are the research topic.

Three broad directions in the analysis of cultural policy have developed in the last thirty years. The first perspective is cultural economics which brought economic theory to the field of cultural activities. This method began with the publication of William Baumol and William Bowen's book *Performing Arts: the Economic Dilemma* (1968) and the founding of *The Journal of Cultural Economics* five years later. Many in the field of cultural economics, like Bruno Frey, hold that the tenets of cultural economics are the methodological devices of individualism and rational choice. Rather than judging what constitutes good and bad art, cultural economists leave these decisions up to the market (Frey, 2000). Cultural economics holds that if institutions, including cultural institutions and the market, take into account the rational economic choices of individuals, culture will flourish.

The second perspective I term the regeneration-through-culture perspective. Rather than understanding policy as being directed at the field of cultural activities, 'cultural regeneration' recognises culture's utility as a tool of the state. The definition of culture is expanded to include the cultural industries (such as media, fashion, leisure and tourism), the activities of community groups, lifestyles and heritage along with the arts.⁵⁶ Culture became a means for generating jobs and income as well as a tool for building community and increasing the quality of life of the populace. Franco Biancini's research into urban regeneration through cultural policy provides an example of this research genre and how it has developed in tandem with changes in how governments use and administer culture (1987; 1993). Biancini notes the changes in the strategic objectives of cultural policies in Western European cities between the 1970s concerns with social and political issues to the 1980s focus on economic and urban development (1993, p. 2). A key difference between the cultural regeneration perspective and the cultural economics perspective is the inclusion of a political dimension in critiquing and understanding the development of cultural policy, allowing the inclusion of issues connected to citizenship and democracy.

⁵⁶ The inclusion of cultural industries was a particularly important development as it moved away from the elitist division between art and administration and recognised that most cultural goods in Western capitalist societies are provided through the market. For an early document that moved cultural policy in this direction in the context of the Greater London Council, an important institution for the development of this cultural policy field, see Garnham (1987).

Cultural regeneration can be applied at various levels from cities to nations as well as specific cultural industries and institutions.⁵⁷ It is beginning to be applied in Asia (Kong, 2000) as Asian states have begun to realise the economic and social advantages of vibrant cultural industries.

The third perspective on cultural policy takes a wider and more critical view of what cultural policy is and what it does. It focuses on issues of identity formation and power that inhabit the cultural connections between institutions and people. This perspective broadens the scope of cultural policy beyond the current cultural policy developments and regeneration strategies to focus, in the words of Toby Miller and George Yudice in their book *Cultural Policy*, on ‘those cultural knowledges and practices that determine the formation and governance of subjects’ (2002, p. 2). The critical perspective includes a broader range of policies and asks more detailed questions about how culture is used by institutions to exert impact on groups and individuals. Finally, the critical perspective brings a rich understanding to the history of cultural policy and historicises its current developments. It recognises that the language and race policies of colonial powers are as much cultural policies as urban regeneration strategies in Europe. Similarly, the present cultural policy moment is understood as the product of a particular historical junction and holds within it the mechanisms, inequalities and assumptions of present and past times and projected futures.

A brief survey of some of the key proponents that fall into this category will help clarify the forms of analysis that it includes. The researcher whose work has been central to the critical position is Tony Bennett, whose arguments I look at in detail in the next section. It is sufficient here to note his extensive research on both cultural policy and museums and his focus on the changing use of cultural institutions in attempts to govern people and groups (1992; 1995; 1998). Alison Beale’s feminist research into cultural policy also falls into this category of research due to her questioning of the gender bias that inhabits the market mechanisms of employment and consumption which have become key elements of the cultural sector (1999). The critical perspective has been used to analyse a range of different topics from institutions such as museums (Bennett, 1989c; 1995) to the cultural

⁵⁷ Journals (such as the British journal *Cultural Trends*) and books (like Schuster, 2002) that are committed to providing statistical information or descriptive data for cultural policy institutions are an element of this approach.

policies of nation-states⁵⁸ to international institutions (Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 165-84).

A problem when applying contemporary cultural policy analysis to a postcolonial setting like Indonesia is the underlying assumption of a Western setting. Clive Barnett's criticism of the critical cultural policy perspective is perhaps even more apt for the other two perspectives:

cultural policy studies ... assumes the existence of the characteristic institutional arrangements of liberal, representative democracy, and the existence of an elaborate public sphere of cultural institutions mediating the relationship between nation-state and citizenry. (1999, p. 374)

All three perspectives outlined above have grown out of debates in the Western academy and have largely focussed on cultural policy developments in the West. Virginia Dominguez and Sasha Welland, in their introduction to an edited book about national cultural policies in East and Southeast Asia, make the point that 'contemporary culturalism is not regionally restricted, not primarily European, and not simply a case of mimicry by Europe's former colonies' (1998, p. 5). Additionally, as Anne Stoler demonstrates in her research into race and culture, the work of culture for the colonial administrations used the same logic as Western nation-states but with different purposes and results (1995a; 1996). Cultural policy was put to work in different ways in Indonesia than the West, and thus requires a methodology that is capable of reflecting on its own assumptions and histories.

Governmentality presents itself as a methodological solution to this problem for two reasons. Firstly, as was demonstrated previously, governmentality provides a method for assessing the complex relationship between Western, colonial and authoritarian regimes that is necessary for an analysis of cultural policy history in a postcolonial setting. Secondly, previous cultural policy research in Asia has successfully employed Foucaultian tools to analyse how culture has been constructed as a discursive formation due to its location within different governmental discourses. Chua Beng Huat and Eddie Kuo's analysis of cultural policy in Singapore identifies Singaporean national identity and Singaporeans as the results of discursive practices with 'temporally changing

⁵⁸ See, for instance, *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* 31, (1) (2001) which collects together research on Scandinavian cultural policy and the articles in Dominguez and Wu's edited book on cultural policy in East and Southeast Asia (1998).

characters' that are "called into existence' by statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices' (1998, p. 37). By recognising Singaporean culture as discursively constructed rather than an object with determined features, Chua and Kuo are able to map changes to official Singaporean culture due to changes in government policies and strategies.⁵⁹ The critical cultural policy perspective, with its links to governmental analysis, is best equipped for analysis of Indonesia.

b. The Cultural Policy Debate in Cultural Studies

Having identified critical cultural policy perspectives as the field of study most able to construct an appropriate framework for the analysis of Indonesian cultural policy, the next step is to explore the key debates and positions within this perspective. A way of moving towards a deeper understanding of the critical cultural policy field is to return to the early debates that surrounded its emergence in Cultural Studies. As has been mentioned previously, a key proponent of the cultural policy perspective in Cultural Studies is Tony Bennett. He was one of the founding members of the Institute of Cultural Policy Research in Queensland,⁶⁰ his writings provided a basis for much contemporary cultural policy research (Barnett, 2001; Whitcomb, 2003), and his research has been consistently cited as a key example of cultural policy analysis (See During, 1993, pp. 16-7; O'Regan, 1992b, p. 518). Bennett's framework for 'putting policy into cultural studies' (1992, p. 23) is outlined below, followed by a brief summary of critiques of his ideas by other Cultural Studies researchers and finally Bennett's reply.⁶¹

Bennett's early texts about cultural policy served as both an outline for a future research direction and a challenge to certain shared understandings amongst Cultural Studies practitioners. The key text that outlined his project is 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies,' which was presented at the Cultural Studies Conference in Illinois in 1990 and printed as part of the proceedings (1992). Other texts produced before this time give a shorter outline of the same project (see, for instance, Bennett, 1989a) and are analysed

⁵⁹ Governmentality is also used to analyse Singaporean cultural policy by Kwok and Low (2002, p. 159).

⁶⁰ See the definitions used by the institute as reported in Bennett (1989a, p. 5) and those used by Bennett himself (1992).

⁶¹ Another key proponent of cultural policy in Cultural Studies has been Stuart Cunningham. See Cunningham (1992a; 1992b) for his approach which seeks to position cultural critique as the 'handmaiden' to Cultural Studies and an account of what Cunningham views as the future of Cultural Studies, which is similar to Bennett's vision.

alongside 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies' to review how Bennett envisaged cultural policy in the early 1990s.

Bennett began his paper with a criticism of the kinds of cultural politics that were prevalent in Cultural Studies and their preoccupation with 'a view of culture which sees it as, chiefly, the domain of signifying practices' (1992, p. 25). This was the first move of an important element of Bennett's argument that took Cultural Studies to task for its tendency to forego engagement with cultural institutions, including the state, in favour of criticism that 'transforms cultural artefacts ... into vehicles for the elaboration and transmission of a generalised form of social criticism' (1989a, p. 7). Bennett argued that Cultural Studies needed to pay more attention to the institutional conditions that regulated different fields of culture. Bennett turned to this task through reviewing Raymond Williams's definitions of culture which are the most important single influence on how culture has been understood in Cultural Studies. Bennett argued that Williams and most Cultural Studies research privileged two of his definitions – culture as 'a way of life' and as 'works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity' – over William's other definition – 'the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development' (Williams, 1983, p. 90).

The effect of overlooking the latter aspect of culture's usage was that Williams and much of Cultural Studies miss 'one of the most distinctive aspects of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century transformations in which the changing and conflicting semantic destinies of 'culture' are implicated' (1992, p. 26). This moment was when culture was put to work within emerging fields of social management. Culture was figured as both object – or target as it refers to the morals, manners and ways of life of a populace – and instrument – in that in its more restricted sense culture refers to the domain of artistic and intellectual activities which can be put to work in governmental programs intervening in and regulating behaviours and attributes of target populations. Initially, artistic and intellectual practices were focussed on the symbolic exclusion of the vast mass of the population from inter-elite communication or, as in the case of Elizabethan theatre, used to disseminate lessons about monarchical power. Through and after the Enlightenment, artistic and intellectual practices came to be understood as capable of improving the mental and behavioural attributes of the general population and were put to work in programs. Through these programs, cultural practices were harnessed to particular types

or regions of subject formation in different ways depending on the prevailing notions of a particular historical period. Within Bennett's formulation, the semiotic properties of cultural practices take a back seat to the 'programmatically, institutionally, and governmental conditions in which cultural practice are inscribed – in short, the network of relations that fall under a properly theoretical understanding of policy' (1992, p. 28) because it is the latter that determine how practices are connected with different parts of life and function to achieve specific effects.

Bennett's focus on the governmental, programmatic and instrumental conditions that give rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:

Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation – in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture. (1992, p. 26)

Bennett further elaborated on this definition when he stated that culture should be thought of as:

a historically produced surface of social regulation whose distinctiveness is to be identified and accounted for in terms of (i) the specific types of attributes and forms of conduct that are established as its targets, (ii) the techniques that are proposed for the maintenance or transformation of such attributes or forms of conduct, (iii) the assembly of such techniques into particular programs of government, and (iv) the inscription of such programs into the operative procedures of specific cultural technologies. (1992, p. 27)

Culture, in this formulation, was clearly bound up with the relations of power that permeate society and the state and determine the conditions of its operation within governmental programs.

Bennett adopted a Foucaultian perspective. His reasons for choosing Foucault over the theorist who had the most influence over Cultural Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, Antonio Gramsci, were twofold.⁶² First, Gramsci commits analysis to an 'automatic' politics which assumes that cultural activities conducted through cultural institutions are bound into the struggle to achieve hegemony, generally for the ruling classes while opposing flows of counter hegemonic ideologies rise out of the subordinate classes (1992, p. 29). Foucault, on the other hand, views power relations as inherently unstable,

⁶² Bennett also argues in favour of Foucault over Habermas (2001). In another paper, Bennett gives a more complete comparison of Foucault and Gramsci with more detailed reasons why he prefers Foucault (1998, pp. 60-84), which I draw from here to supplement 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies'.

pursuing multiple ends and dispersed. For Foucault, the development of modern forms of government 'goes beyond the problematic of political obedience to replace it with a concern with knowing, regulating and changing the conditions of the population in potentially limitless ways' (Bennett, 1998, p. 70). The focus of Foucault's analysis therefore is on the exercise of power in programs, technologies and practices of cultural institutions, making it a more useful framework for revealing what is actually happening.

Second, Bennett argued that the Gramscian search for a unified class, people or race that will act as a social agent is misguided and has hindered the development of 'more specific and immediate forms of political calculation and action' that would attempt to influence the agendas and procedures of those groups that regularly input into decisions within cultural fields (1992, p. 29). Bennett argued that Cultural Studies needs to move away from such a perspective and instead connect to the requirements and concerns of people working within cultural institutions and government, as those agents influence the institutional conditions that produce culture. Foucault's insights provided a way of reorienting Cultural Studies because they encourage attention to be paid to the detailed routines and operating procedures of cultural institutions and enable intellectuals 'to connect with the debates and practices through which reformist adjustments to the administration of culture are actually brought about' (1998, p. 61).

Bennett's ideas about the future direction of Cultural Studies were strongly refuted by some of its practitioners. The main thrust of Bennett's critics was that moving towards a position at ease with engagement with institutions (state institutions in particular) was at odds with the critical vocation of Cultural Studies and compromised its independence (Curthoys, 1991; During, 1993, p. 17; Grace, 1991; Jameson, 1993, p. 29; McGuigan, 1996, pp. 12-29). In reply, cultural policy researchers connected Bennett's advocacy of a greater engagement with policy to a particular political moment in Australia while the centre-left Labour government was in power (S. Cunningham, 1992b; Miller, 1998, p. 46). Other critics, such as Meaghan Morris and Tom O'Regan, took issue with the structure of the debate itself which constructed a hierarchy between cultural criticism and cultural policy (Morris, 1992; O'Regan, 1992a). O'Regan, for instance, argued that cultural criticism is in fact a necessary element of the policy process and indeed exists in a symbiotic relationship with cultural policy (1992a, p. 418). Bennett responded by examining the structures that maintain the hierarchy between culture and policy.

Bennett argued that dividing cultural criticism from cultural policy (or, in O'Regan's terminology, bottom-up from top-down approaches) hid the extent to which the cultural politics and practices that are the subject of cultural criticism are dependent on cultural policies (Bennett, 1998, pp. 200-3). Bennett used James Clifford's advocacy of a community perspective in contemporary museum practice to demonstrate that transforming museums into 'contact zones' for 'communities' is in fact a reconfiguration of relations of government and culture and not a radical departure from past museum practice (1998, pp. 200-13).

Clive Barnett makes a separate criticism of Bennett's formulation of cultural policy in regards to his use of Foucault. Barnett suggests that Bennett's cultural policy research has 'conflated' discipline and government (1999, p. 381) due to its focus on institutions with well-defined spatial boundaries. He writes that 'authoritative accounts' such as Bennett's research into museums, 'tend to construct the deployment of culture in terms of a monitorial disciplinary regime which inculcates new ethical practices of self-formation in distinctive spatio-temporal locales' (1999, p. 378). Such research, according to Barnett, suffers from two related deficiencies. Firstly, it overstates the efficacy of the disciplinary regimes in cultural institutions (a) because it ignores both how those institutions are generally more 'open' than the 'enclosed spaces of containment' examined by Foucault (1991a) and (b) because of the way that subjects move between locales with different disciplinary regimes. Secondly, the focus on discipline ignores the broader operation of Foucault's concept of biopower with its mode of operation at the level of populations. Barnett suggests that more attention needs to be paid to other forms of regulation such as 'discourses of the subject' and 'practices of individual self-regulation' in addition to 'disciplining the conduct of bodies' (1999, p. 383-4).

However, Barnett may be selling Bennett's version of cultural policy analysis short through reading analysis of the functioning of museums as analysis of all cultural institutions. In a slight revision of his method in 1997, Bennett writes that it is not sufficient to 'define the concerns of Cultural Policy Studies' as being with the ways that government shapes the characteristics of populations (which is already broader than the focus on individual bodies that Barnett attributes to him). Instead, Bennett writes:

what analysis most needs to concern itself with in any policy context is precisely how the activities of government aim to influence the widely diverse ways in

which cultural and intellectual resources are produced and circulated (ranging from associational forms of community production through to the cultural industries), in view of the role that these play in shaping both particular ways of life and the relationships between ways of life. (1997, p. 171)

Within this formulation, culture is implicated in a much broader set of governmental relations than the disciplining of bodies. It encompasses the twin domains of disciplining the body (in cultural institutions) and managing populations as it is concerned with ‘ways of life and the relations between ways of life’.⁶³

Positions and Issues for Analysis of Indonesian Cultural Policy

This thesis is located at the intersection between the expansion of governmental and Foucaultian analysis of Indonesia and debates about governmental analysis of cultural policy. The key contention, borrowed from the critical cultural policy perspective, is that culture is constructed by governmental discourses and the power relations that shape the conditions of its use in any given situation determine its content. Bringing together the two fields to research Indonesian cultural policy raises four issues.

The first issue involves a criticism of governmentality is that it overestimates the effectiveness of policy. James Donald writes that practitioners of governmentality tend to present the ‘souls’ of citizens as being regulated and controlled by governmental practices by positing ‘a preformed self as the necessary target on which the machinery [of government] works’ (1992, p. 93). Barnett writes that there has been a similar tendency in the case of cultural policy analysis that has taken a governmental perspective. He writes that the ‘cultural-policy studies literature tends to assume a high degree of fit between the political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation’ (1999, p. 377).⁶⁴ The assumption of effectiveness could, in the case of analysis about official cultural policy like this thesis, represent the state as determining the features of either culture or cultural subjectivity.

In order to combat such representations, two positions need to be established from the outset. Firstly, my analysis needs to recognise the heterogeneity of discourse and

⁶³ Kian-Woon Kwok and Kee-Hong Low also acknowledge these two dimensions: ‘Cultural policy ... is also primarily concerned with not just collective representations (for example, of the nation-state) but also with constructions of the individual, with what Foucault called the ‘technologies of the self’ (2002, p. 165).

⁶⁴ Whitcomb makes a similar point in her analysis of debates and issues surrounding museums. Whitcomb demonstrates that understanding museological practices as solely the product of governmental uses of culture overlooks the multiple meanings, histories and contexts present in the museum (2003).

Foucault's concept of 'power-games'. Discourse are constantly negotiated, misunderstood and used in unexpected ways.⁶⁵ Grounding cultural policy analysis in concrete historical research involves understanding the wider political and historical processes that contribute to generating policy and how those policies have operated in specific institutions and instances. Secondly, the state needs to be understood as the largest and most influential set of institutions that seek to utilise culture, but not as either the only institution or as a single, unified entity. Although the responsibility for regulating culture is often in the hands of non-state institutions, the uses of culture are increasingly under the purview of the state, whether directly or indirectly.⁶⁶ The state is addressed here as a dispersed and at times conflicting range of institutions and the limits of its control are understood as constantly contested and shifting.

The second issue is the relationship between broad and narrow definitions of cultural policy. Bennett notes culture's importance 'as a set of artistic and intellectual forms' because of its ability to act on and influence the attributes and behaviours (ways of life) of particular populations and the relations between them (1989b, p. 6). The deployment of 'culture' in a narrow sense was therefore the instrument for transformation of culture in a broad sense as 'ways of life'. Bennett traces the process of this now widespread splitting back to the emergence of 'liberal forms of government' in the nineteenth century where the deployment of culture would 'help cultivate a capacity for voluntary self-regulation in the general population' (1998, p. 110). The deployment of artistic and intellectual forms through institutions and programs is, as suggested by the literature on Indonesian cultural policy and in the chapters that follow, an important cultural strategy of government and part of the governmental conditions that produce culture. Although this thesis focuses on cultural policy in its narrow sense, interactions with both broad definitions of culture and cultural policy are important elements of how cultural policy is devised and deployed.

The third issue is the question of how to engage with the state in post-Suharto Indonesia. Criticism of Bennett's critical cultural perspective has, as I explored in the previous

⁶⁵ The position taken in this thesis is similar to the position taken by Stuart Cunningham: that critical cultural policy research requires a wider rather than a narrower critical understanding of what constitutes policy, which encompasses understanding the conditions that generate policy outcomes in their entirety (1992a, p. 535).

⁶⁶ This is a subset of what Foucault addresses in his comment that 'power relations have been progressively governmentalised' (1982, p. 224).

section, centred on his call for greater engagement with institutions and in particular the state. Bennett and other advocates of greater engagement have been taken ‘to task for overstating the case for a ‘useful knowledge’ of an involvement in governmental practices over the cultivation and deployment of a critical knowledge’ (Yudice, 1999, p. 2). In contrast to Bennett’s model of engagement, much Foucaultian research has been aimed at upsetting rather than working with the structures of intelligibility that organise practices, identities and institutions. Michael Shapiro writes that Foucault’s genealogical method is one of disrupting and defamiliarising the familiar (1992, p. 2). He writes:

the genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility as ... false arrests, as the arbitrary fixings of the momentary results of struggles among contending forces, struggles that could have produced other possible systems of intelligibility and the orders they support. (1992, p. 2)

The end of the Suharto era has been a time of review and change, which is where a critical Foucaultian perspective can contribute. I hope to present a historical analysis of contemporary practices, indicating and exploring the struggles and choices and opening up new narratives and histories for exploration in the area of cultural policy. The timing is right for critical disruptions of the present given the current political climate and the openings that have emerged in Indonesia since 1999.

Finally, an important issue for cultural policy analysis that recurs throughout this thesis is the issue of aesthetics or taste. Contemporary academic understandings about aesthetics have revolved around the writings of Bourdieu. Bourdieu rejected the Kantian notion of disinterested judgement (Kant, 1987, p. 228), instead preferring to understand aesthetics as a product of education, family and the social trajectories of economic class and status (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 3-6). Bourdieu’s analysis has been used in two ways in writings about aesthetics: to relativise the value distinctions made between high and low cultural forms, arguing for equivalence (Fiske, 1992; Rowse, 1985); or arguing that sociological research should not obliterate but reshape divisions of value (McGuigan, 1996; Street, 2000).⁶⁷ Aesthetics as a category for this thesis is not dependent on the outcome of this debate, but around the question of how taste relates to politics. John Street writes:

judgement is not simply a product of ... discourses; it is also the legitimisation of these discourses and the processes which include or exclude particular forms of discourse. Aesthetic judgement is the product of a process in which authority is assigned and legitimated. (2000, p. 48)

⁶⁷ For a critical analysis of Bourdieu’s position on the desirability of distinctions between high and low cultural forms, see Bennett (2005).

Aesthetics therefore can function in a normative system designed to reinforce existing power structures or can be used to resist such normative systems.

An important aspect of cultural policy is how it seeks to educate the citizenry into a set of tastes or aesthetics. The citizen who internalises the correct set of tastes and morals is more likely to monitor their own behaviour according to state-defined norms. Taste provides an alternative value register to ethnicity and religion, both of which the state views as problematic in Indonesia due to their diversity and their potential for evoking deep divisions. Miller and Yudice write:

An aesthetic of truth and beauty is, as per Kant, the internal monitor within each person that provides a collective, national, categorical imperative. Its very *ethos* of singular appreciation becomes, ironically, a connecting chord of national harmony, binding individual goals to an implied national unity. (2002, p. 10)

Aesthetics has the potential to both transcend class and ethnicity (and manage them) through the internalisation of knowledge of what is desirable and ‘normal’.

5. Thesis Outline

In this thesis, I make use of the periodisation of Indonesian history by political regimes that has become standard in most Indonesian history texts that encompass the twentieth century (see, for instance, Cribb & Brown, 1995; Ricklefs, 2001). The use of political regimes to mark eras is fitting here because the governmental changes brought by new political regimes are considered the key generators of cultural policy change. However, my use of political eras does not assume that policy change naturally occurs with regime change. Considerable attention is given to the reasons for cultural policy changes and continuities, both between and within political eras.

This thesis is divided into two parts that correspond to the two thesis objectives (see p. 20) which were derived from the current state of cultural policy analysis in Indonesian Studies. It makes use of a variety of primary and secondary sources, including interviews, previously unexamined archival material from the 1950s and 1960s and New Order cultural policy documents. Part I provides a historical account of how cultural policy has been constituted in Indonesia from the late colonial period to the post-New Order ‘Reformasi’ era. The first five chapters demonstrate how technologies of government developed in Europe were translated to and put to work in Indonesia and altered across

time due to both internal and external circumstances. This requires analysis of the changing governmental rationalities in Indonesia across the twentieth century and their implications for cultural policy and the conditions that constitute culture. Chapter one provides important historical information about the foundations of post-independence cultural policy that can be found in the cultural policies of the late colonial and occupying Japanese administrations while the following chapters, with the partial exception of chapter three, make use of more substantive data to analyse the cultural policy of the post-independence era.

The five chapters are chronological and follow a similar pattern. They begin with a discussion of how culture was formulated in governmental discourse before moving to the details of official cultural policy in order to identify the distinctive features of the cultural policy of particular eras. The exceptions to this method are chapters three and four that analyse the New Order era. Chapter three provides important background information through presenting an account of the causes of the changing articulation of culture in governmental discourses while chapter four analyses the impact of these changes on official cultural policy, thus replicating the pattern across two chapters.

My emphasis in Part I is on official policies and the discourses that informed them, rather than the activities and criticisms of non-state individuals and groups. I seek to explore the changing ways the state used culture and include the activities and writings of non-state actors only where they intersected with cultural policy programs or changes in cultural policy. Focussing on official cultural policies that were applied across Indonesia excludes two noteworthy categories. These are Chinese Indonesians, who have been subject to state policies that at different times have aimed to differentiate them from and assimilate them into the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1993) and were rarely addressed in cultural policy, and Bali, which has been granted a special status as a culturally-rich 'living museum' since the Dutch conquest of Bali in 1908 (Picard, 1997, p. 185). The treatment of Chinese Indonesians and Bali require more extensive analysis than is possible here and have both been the subject of considerable scholarly attention.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ On the forces that shaped Balinese cultural identity including governance during the colonial and independence periods, see Picard (1997; 1999), Schulte Nordholt (1986) and Vickers (1989). On Chinese Indonesians, see, Coppell (1983; 2002), Godley and Lloyd (2001), Heryanto (1998), Mackie (1976) and Suryadinata (1993).

Part II consists of two case studies of cultural programs run by the Directorate of Culture. The chapters explore the links between cultural programs and governmental rationalities as well as demonstrating how different discourses combined in different ways in different institutional locations to alter the operation of cultural policies. They focus on the technologies and techniques of cultural institutions that were inscribed into cultural programs, how these were spread across Indonesia and how the broader political and social changes since 1998 have influenced the actual operations of cultural policy. Instead of assuming uniform outcomes generated by a centralised, singular state, the case studies explore the possibility of a plural and diverse array of outcomes and occurrences. Additionally, these chapters recognise the resistances both within institutions and by the subjects of cultural policy to the strategies and designs of Indonesian governments. The two case studies tackle quite different cultural institutions. The first case study chapter investigates the creation and operation of two kinds of arts institutions across Indonesia: the *taman budaya* (cultural parks) and the *dewan kesenian* (arts councils). The cultural parks and the arts councils were located within the provincial capital cities and were therefore situated within a diverse range of locations. The second case study chapter examines a series of national cultural research projects coordinated by the Directorate of Culture.

Finally, it should be noted that the methodological framing of Part II does not preclude discussion of themes that are specific to those institutions. On the contrary, it opens up new areas of discussion through its appreciation of the productive power of governmental discourses. For instance, chapter six identifies how the cultural parks were the site of various governmental programs that positioned the arts in a variety of ways and chapter seven examines how the field of local culture was fashioned through state-sponsored research projects.